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ABSTRACT
In 1962, Mohring and Harwitz derived conditions under which an optimally
designed and priced road would be self-financing. This paper briefly summarizes
subsequent research on the relationship between congestion-toll revenues and
road costs. Despite its transparency, the self-financing theorem can lead to
erroneous interpretations. A simple numerical model is used to investigate three
possible misinterpretations. The welfare losses are found to be substantial if capital
and investment cost are confused or if a balanced-budget constraint is imposed
under second-best network conditions. In contrast, losses from imposing a
balanced-budget constraint when economies or diseconomies of scale exist are
surprisingly small.
Ke y Words: road capacity choice, road financing, road pricing, traffic congestion
1. INTRODUCTION
It is a long-accepted economic principle that maximizing the benefits an
economy provides to its members requires setting prices equal to marginal
costs. One cost of road usage is the external congestion cost that each user
imposes on all other users by adding to congestion. Economists interested
in transportation have long regarded incorporating congestion costs into road
prices as essential to an efficient use of roads (e.g., Pigou, 1920; Walters,
1961).
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In 1962, one of us participated in pointing out that, under certain technical
conditions (to be spelled out below), an optimally designed and priced road would
generate toll revenues just sufficient to cover its capital costs in the long run
(Mohring and Harwitz, 1962). A number of scholars have explored the robustness
of that finding. They asked, ‘‘Would optimal toll revenues cover optimal capital
costs under a variety of more realistic circumstances?’’ and, ‘‘If optimal toll reven-
ues would not cover optimal capital costs but if roads must be self-supporting, what
adjustments in tolls and road design would be required to maximize road benefits
given a break-even constraint?’’
The first part of this paper briefly summarizes the results of research on the
relationship between congestion-toll revenues and road costs. We present the
self-financing result in its most basic form and review some of the extensions that
have been discussed in the literature. The self-financing theorem, despite its trans-
parency, easily lends itself to erroneous interpretations. The second part of this
paper discusses three such possible fallacies and develops a simple numerical
model to investigate the potential relative welfare losses that may result from them.
The model shows that naı¨ve interpretations of the Mohring–Harwitz rule for
investing toll revenues may lead to substantial welfare losses. These losses are
particularly prominent if capital and investment costs are confused or if a
balanced-budget constraint is imposed under second-best network conditions
(the example presented considers the rather common situation where an
unpriced substitute exists). In contrast, losses from imposing a balanced-budget
constraint when economies or diseconomies of scale exist are surprisingly small.
2. CONGESTION TOLLS AND ROAD COSTS: THE SIMPLEST CASE
2.1. Household Travel Choice
Consider a set of identical households that enjoy consuming trips on a given
road. However, each household dislikes spending the time (t per trip) required
to make the trip. Assume that we can characterize traffic conditions in our period
of analysis by a simple travel time function t(F=K), where t is travel time, F (for
flow) denotes the number of trips per hour being taken on the road, and K gives
the road’s hourly capacity. Assume that besides travel time, there is only one other
price component of trip making for a household, namely a toll s (if levied). If we
denote the value of time by a, the perceived generalized price or full price of the trip,
p, can be written as the sum of the generalized cost c and the toll s:
p ¼ cðF =K Þ þ s ¼ a  tðF =K Þ þ s: ð1Þ
The equilibrium flow will then be such that the marginal benefit—the benefit
attached to the final trip added—is equalized to the generalized price: if marginal
benefit is higher, more trips will be taken; if it is lower, some trips will be suppressed.
The marginal benefit function MB(F) therefore determines the equilibrium
demand (measured in flow) as a function of generalized price p. MB(F) is therefore
also referred to as the inverse demand, D(F ): ‘‘inverse,’’ because quantity as a
function of price, F(p), is expressed as price as a function of quantity, D(F).
E. T. Verhoef and H. Mohring
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Aggregate household behavior can thus be represented by the equilibrium
condition:
DðF Þ ¼ cðF =K Þ þ s: ð2Þ
2.2. Toll and Capacity Optimization
A public highway-authority might wonder what the ‘‘best’’ toll level is. The
answer of course depends on the objective chosen. An (economic) efficiency-
enhancing objective would be to maximize social surplus (or net benefits): the
difference between aggregate benefits of trip making and the social cost of making
these trips possible. With D(F) representing marginal benefits, its integral between
0 and F gives total benefits (per unit of time). The social cost consists of two
components. One is the total user cost, F  c(), equal to the product of flow and
average cost. The other is total capacity cost, which we assume depends on capacity
K only and that will be written as CK(K). It is to be interpreted as a per-unit-of-time
cost, so it should include capital and depreciation; it is not the investment cost.
The highway-authority’s optimization problem thus reads:
Max
F ;K
S ¼
Z F
0
DðxÞdx  F  cðF =K Þ  CK ðK Þ
s:t: : DðF Þ  cðF =K Þ  s ¼ 0:
ð3Þ
The first-order condition with respect to flow F shows that it is optimal to equate
marginal benefit D(F) to the marginal social cost of a trip, which is the sum of
the private cost c() incurred by the individual, and the marginal external cost
F  @c()=@F that a road user imposes on fellow road users due to congestion:
@S
@F
¼ DðF Þ  cðÞ  F  @cðÞ
@F
¼ 0 ) s ¼ F  @cðÞ
@F
: ð4Þ
The second expression in (4) follows from substitution of the equilibrium
constraint in (3) and shows that optimal road use requires imposition of the
so-called Pigouvian toll, which is equal to the marginal external cost as just defined.
The total toll revenues R are then:
R ¼ F 2  @cðÞ
@F
: ð5Þ
The first-order condition of (3) with respect to K tells us to expand capacity up to
the point where the marginal benefits of doing so (i.e., the value of aggregate
travel time saving) is equal to the marginal cost of capacity:
@S
@K
¼ F  @cðÞ
@K
 dCK
dK
¼ 0: ð6Þ
Note that, because capacity only enters the two cost components of equation (3), cost
minimization (by setting K for a given F ) is directly implied by the maximization of
Self-Financing Roads
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social surplus. With the elasticity of capital cost with respect to capacity j defined
as follows:
j ¼ dCK
dK
 K
CK
ð7Þ
we can rewrite (6) as follows:
F  @cðÞ
@K
¼ j  CK
K
: ð8Þ
As a brief side-step, we note that the quotient rule of differentiation tells us that for
any function c(F=K), the following holds true (this is, in fact, an application of Euler’s
theorem):
F  @cðÞ
@F
¼ K  @cðÞ
@K
: ð9Þ
Bringing K to the left-hand side in (8) and substitution of (9) and then (5) finally
produces the following equation:
R ¼ j  CK ) /  R
CK
¼ j: ð10Þ
The first expression in equation (10) tells us that provided an optimal toll is charged
[equation (4) applies] and capacity is optimized [equation (6) applies], the per-
unit-of-time revenues from optimal pricing R are equal to the per-unit-of-time
capacity cost CK, multiplied by the elasticity j. Phrased differently, the second expres-
sion in (10) states that the degree of self-financing, which we define as /R=CK, is equal
to the elasticity of capital cost with respect to capacity j. This is the celebrated
self-financing theorem of Mohring and Harwitz (1962, Chapter 2); the special case
with neutral scale economies (j¼ 1) can be referred to as the ‘‘exact’’ self-financing
theorem.
Thus, with neutral scale economies, an optimally priced road designed to
minimize the sum of user and provider costs would generate toll revenues that
would just cover its provider’s costs. Optimally designed and priced roads would
thus exactly support themselves. When there are economies of scale in capacity
provision (j< 1), there will be a deficit; with diseconomies (j> 1) a surplus
results. These results are entirely consistent with basic micro economic insights
that tell us that a firm that is forced to apply marginal cost pricing will face a deficit
under economies of scale, a zero-surplus under neutral scale economies, and a
surplus under diseconomies of scale. Mohring and Harwitz’s contribution was to
show that this remains true if part of the inputs in the production process (namely,
the time invested to make a trip) are user-supplied under congested conditions.
The theorem appears highly relevant for practical policymaking. Its application
in practice would in the first place imply that the road operator seeks to achieve an
efficient road system, in terms of optimal capacity and optimal pricing. Second,
application would firmly reduce the need to use tax revenues from other sources
for the financing of roads. This may improve efficiency further, because these
E. T. Verhoef and H. Mohring
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other taxes are often distortionary. Third, it may help in overcoming problems of
public acceptability of road pricing. The resulting scheme is likely to be perceived
as ‘‘fair’’ (only the users of a road pay for its capacity) and ‘‘transparent’’ (there are
no ‘‘hidden’’ transfers surrounding the financing of roads). Finally, it may lead to
improved transparency in political decisions on infrastructure expansion. It is
easily demonstrated that if the neutral-economies-of-scale assumption is fulfilled,
and other external costs are optimally priced, road capacity should be expanded
when short-run optimal congestion pricing yields revenues per unit of capacity that
exceed the unit (capital) cost of capacity.1 The market would thus indicate
whether or not expansion is socially warranted, which will generally help
improving the transparency and credibility of cost–benefit analyses.
2.3. Trouble
But there are also problems. For example: roads are lumpy. They must have an
integer number of lanes; p lanes won’t do. The capacity of lanes can be varied by
changing their widths, altering curves, and making them more or less steep, but
lanes must be wide enough to allow vehicles to pass. Still, nothing guarantees that
the traffic level that satisfies equations (4) and (6) would have the capacity that an
integer number of lanes would provide. If not, equation (6) is not satisfied and the
remainder of the analysis breaks down. How big a threat is this to the practical
applicability of the theorem? As indicated, because road design affects the capacity
per lane, the problem may be somewhat smaller than it seems at first sight (when
only thinking of ‘‘numbers of lanes’’), as long of course as we are beyond capacities
of one lane. Moreover, when an operator can pool deficits from oversized roads
with surpluses from undersized ones, the relative problem will be smaller for full
networks than for individual roads. And, when demand grows steadily over time,
one can anticipate alternating periods of deficits and surpluses for individual
roads, so that also pooling ‘‘over time’’ would reduce the relative size of the
problem compared with what might appear from an instantaneous analysis.
Nevertheless, as indicated, especially for smaller roads economies of scale may
often dominate, and exact self-financing would not be consistent with optimal
road design and pricing.
Next, the assumption of neutral scale economies in road construction is
essential to the conclusion that, on optimally designed and priced roads, toll
revenues exactly cover capital costs. Sadly for the theorem, both rural and urban
road construction may have increasing or decreasing returns to scale (e.g.,
Mohring, 1976; Keeler and Small, 1977; Kraus, 1981; Small, Winston, and Evans,
1989), so that exact self-financing need not apply in reality—even if capacity were
continuous. The consequences will be explored numerically in Section 3 below;
here we briefly address the backgrounds.
1To see why, observe that for a given demand function, both the short-run optimal conges-
tion price (i.e., for a given capacity) and the road use per unit of capacity are decreasing in
capacity. Short-run optimal toll revenues per unit of capacity therefore exceed the unit cost
of capacity with a below-optimal total capacity and fall short of it with an above-optimal total
capacity.
Self-Financing Roads
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A rural road with one 12-foot lane in each direction is commonly regarded as hav-
ing a capacity of about 2000 vehicles an hour regardless of their directional division;
on such roads, travelers in one lane must wait for both an adequate view of the other
lane and a gap in its traffic. With four-lane roads, only a gap in one direction is
necessary. Road expansion from two to four lanes therefore increases hourly capa-
city to about 2000 vehicles per lane; doubling lanes quadruples road capacity.
Rural and to a lesser extent, urban road geometry may also often involve scale
economies. A normal rural expressway has two 12-foot lanes in each direction with
wide paved shoulders on each side. The driving lanes themselves account for less
than half of its right of way and of the costs of the earth-moving required to create
it. Three lanes in each direction would add 50% to its capacity but considerably less
than 50% to its capital cost.
At the same time, urban expressways have many more interchanges and
overpasses per mile than do their rural counterparts. Doubling the span of a
bridge more than doubles its costs. Walls rather than earthen slopes form its
boundaries. The excavation economies associated with increased lanes are, there-
fore, smaller for urban than rural roads and may even turn into diseconomies.
Moreover, scale diseconomies could also arise from a rising supply price of urban
land, especially in large cities where urban land is scarce (Small, 1999). For all of
these reasons, scale economies are considerably smaller and may even turn to
diseconomies for urban roads—where capacity expansion is often more
relevant—than for rural roads. Small and Verhoef (2007) review a number of
studies and conclude, ‘‘Altogether, the evidence supports the likelihood of mild
scale economies for the overall highway network in major cities. Scale economies
are probably substantial in smaller cities in which one or two major expressways are
important, and may disappear altogether in very large cities where expanding
expressways is extraordinarily expensive due to high urban density’’ (p. 112).
And finally, for exact self-financing to hold, actually two neutral-scale-economies
assumptions have to be fulfilled (Mohring and Harwitz, 1962, pp. 85–86). One is
what Small (1992) called ‘‘constant returns to scale in congestion technology’’:
the fact that the travel time function can be written as t(F=K). The other is ‘‘neutral
scale economies in road construction’’: j¼ 1. In reality, what matters is the com-
bined effect of these two elements: decreasing economies in the one respect can
be compensated for by increasing economies in the other. As a matter of fact, units
of capacity can always be chosen such that j¼ 1 is satisfied, namely by defining a
measure of capacity that is proportional to (minimized) capacity cost. But whether
the combined effect implies neutral scale economies is, as just discussed, an empiri-
cal question for which the answer seems to vary over place and probably time.
3. SOME EXTENSIONS
The self-financing result from our basic model suggests a very simple and clear
relation between infrastructure charging and capacity costs: the degree of self-
financing is equal to the elasticity of the capacity cost function. An important
question is to what extent this result is a fluke, resulting from specific simplifying
assumptions in the basic model, and to what extent it carries over to more
elaborate settings. This section will consider a number of complications that were
E. T. Verhoef and H. Mohring
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ignored above but that will be relevant in practical applications. Our discussion will
follow and sometimes draw from reviews as given by Lindsey and Verhoef (2000),
De Palma and Lindsey (2005), and Small and Verhoef (2007).
3.1. Growing Traffic
As economies grow and population increases, so, too, do the demands for road
space. Continual infinitesimal expansion of a road would be intolerably expensive.
Standard practice is to expand capacity to a level greater than that which would be
optimal for a steady-state traffic level at the time expansion takes place. Traffic
then grows to and then above the level which would be optimal for the expanded
road’s capacity. At some point, further expansion becomes in order. Consider a
road authority in a growing economy that wants to design and to price its network
so as to maximize the present value of its future user benefits minus user and
road-authority costs. Setting marginal-cost congestion tolls would be an essential
part of this optimization process. An interesting question then arises: as with roads
in a steady-state economy, would such congestion tolls exactly cover the network’s
capital costs in a growing economy given constant returns to scale in road produc-
tion? Arnott and Kraus (1998a) address this question. They find that the
self-financing theorem remains valid in present value terms, provided the size of
capacity additions is optimized conditional on the timing of investments. This is
true whether or not capacity is added continuously or intermittently and whether
or not the timing of investments is optimal.
3.2. Heterogeneous Users
The same authors address heterogeneity across users and find that, as long as
every user faces an optimal charge, this does not undermine the self-financing
theorem (Arnott and Kraus, 1998b). The important precondition is that marginal
cost pricing applies to all users: when not all users are charged or when charges
deviate from marginal cost pricing for other reasons [so that equation (4) above
does not apply], the self-financing result generally breaks down.
3.3. Time-of-Day Dynamics
One of the more disturbing simplifications of the basic model in Section 2 is
that congestion is assumed to be a static, stationary-state phenomenon. This is
helpful in keeping our discussion transparent but rather unrealistic when looking
at real-world traffic congestion. It is therefore important to verify whether the
self-financing result remains intact when taking the time patterns of congestion
and optimal congestion tolls into account. Arnott and Kraus (1998a) have shown
that this is indeed the case, provided tolls can be varied optimally over time. A
specific example of this result has been given for the so-called bottleneck model,
first introduced by Vickrey (1969) and later analyzed in greater depth by Arnott,
de Palma, and Lindsey (1993).2
2Arnott and Kraus (1998a) consider growth in demand over calendar time. Arnott, de Palma,
and Lindsey (1993) consider systematic fluctuations in demand by time of day. Demand is
intertemporally substitutable in Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey (1993) but not Arnott and
Kraus (1998a).
Self-Financing Roads
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3.4. Network Extensions
The self-financing result also continues to hold when extending the analysis
from a single road or bottleneck to a full network. Yang and Meng (2002) show
that self-financing will hold for every individual link in an optimally priced network
and therefore also for the network at large. As we shall see in Section 4 below,
network effects do lead to a breakdown of the self-financing result if other parts
of the network are not optimally priced.
3.5. Further Extensions
Various other extensions have been considered in the literature.
Newbery (1989) for example considered self-financing in the face of durability
choice and maintenance cost and concluded that ‘‘if there are constant returns to
scale in roads construction (for roads of given strength), and if there are strictly
constant returns to road use (in the sense that heavy vehicles distribute themselves
uniformly over road width), then the optimal road user charge (congestion charge
plus road damage charge) will recover all road costs (maintenance and interest
on capital)’’ (Newbery, 1989, p. 167).
Small (1999) considered variable input prices, relevant for urban land that may
rise in price when demand for road construction increases. This matter makes
explicit the distinction between ‘‘returns to scale’’ (a property of a production
function) and ‘‘economies of scale’’ (a property of a cost function). Small shows
that the sign of actual profits from highway operation under first-best marginal
cost pricing will then still be determined by the degree of scale of the cost function
(which differs from the degree of returns to scale of production with a rising
supply curve for land). The critical condition for exact self-financing under
marginal cost pricing thus involves the degree of economies of scale of the cost
function and not the degree of returns to scale of its underlying production
function.
3.6. Conclusion
In general, we find that extensions to the simple model of Section 2 lead to
important additional insights but generally do not undermine the self-financing
theorem as summarized in equation (10).
4. SOME FALLACIES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF SELF-FINANCING
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
As the foregoing illustrated, the Mohring–Harwitz theorem is a strong result,
with important policy implications, and extends to various more realistic instances
than the case for which it is typically illustrated in textbooks. Practical application
would not only result in the use of optimal investment and pricing rules, but—
provided the appropriate technical conditions are approximately fulfilled—also
to a balanced budget for road operations, which in turn might have political
and social advantages related to transparency and perceived fairness. At the same
time, the theorem lends itself to fallacious interpretation. In this section, we will
highlight three plausible mistakes that a public operator can make in interpreting
E. T. Verhoef and H. Mohring
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the theorem, and we will assess the potential (welfare) implications of such
misinterpretation using a small numerical example. The analysis bears resem-
blance to studies into the use of naı¨ve cost–benefit investment rules for road
infrastructure, as reviewed in, for example, Small and Verhoef (2007). We will
study, in that order, (1) the case where the regulator mistakenly assumes the
theorem to imply that under neutral scale economies, all toll revenues should
be reinvested in capacity (a mixing up of capital costs with investment costs);
(2) the case where the regulator imposes a balanced-budget restriction when there
are increasing or decreasing scale economies in capacity; and (3) the case where
the regulator imposes a balanced-budget restriction when second-best pricing is
appropriate due to unpriced congestion elsewhere in the network. We start with
a brief discussion of the numerical model that we will be using.
4.1. A Numerical Model
We use a numerical model that considers static congestion for homogeneous
travelers between a single origin–destination pair connected by a single road (at
least in the first two applications of the model). Demand is isoelastic, with the
elasticity with respect to generalized price p equal to g, and the associated inverse
demand function is
DðF Þ ¼ d  F 1=g; ð11Þ
where D is marginal willingness-to-pay, F is traffic flow, and d is a parameter.
The generalized price p is again the sum of average cost c and a toll s, where c
is now specified according to the widely used BPR (Bureau of Public Roads)
function:
p ¼ c þ s ¼ a  tf  1 þ b  F
K
 v 
þ s; ð12Þ
where a is the value of time, tf the free-flow travel time, K the road’s capacity, and
b and v are parameters. Note that c only contains time costs.
We ignore road maintenance and depreciation. The capital cost is also isoelastic
and is given by
CK ¼ c  K0
K0ð Þj  K
j; ð13Þ
where j is the elasticity of capital cost with respect to capacity, and c the average
unit price of capacity evaluated at a base-level of capacity K0 (note that the middle
term consists of parameters only and could therefore easily be avoided by redefin-
ing c; it is included only for ease of calibration).
Total benefit can be determined as the area below the inverse demand function,
so that social surplus S, our measure for welfare, can be written as:
S ¼ d 
Z F
0
x1=g dx|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
User benefit
 F  a  tf  1 þ b  F
K
 v  
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
ðVariableÞ user cos t
 c  K0
K0ð Þj  K
j
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
ðFixedÞ capital cos t
: ð14Þ
Self-Financing Roads
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We choose the following parameters. The BPR parameters b and v are set equal to
0.15 and 4, respectively; their conventional values. The free-flow travel time tf is set
at 0.5, so we consider a 60-km road if the speed limit is 120 km=hr. The base capital
cost elasticity j is 1. We seek a representative unit price of capacity c for a
three-lane (one-directional) highway, which we assume to involve K0¼ 4500, so
that a conventional traffic lane would correspond with K¼ 1500. This implies a
doubling of travel times at a use level of around 2400 vehicles per lane per hour.
This is roughly in accordance with the flow at which, empirically, travel times
double for a single highway lane and the maximum flow on a lane is reached
(e.g., Small, 1992, Fig. 3.4, p. 66). A maximum flow, however, is not defined for
BPR functions. The average unit price of capacity at capacity level K0, c, is set equal
to 7 (all monetary costs are in Euros). With a unit of time of 1 hour, this parameter
ought to reflect the hourly capital costs. To derive a value from empirical construc-
tion cost estimates, an assumption has to be made on whether the model aims to
represent stationary traffic conditions throughout a day or during peak hours only.
Our parameterization concerns the latter. The value of 7 was then derived by
dividing the estimated average yearly capital cost of one highway lane kilometer
in The Netherlands (40.2 million)3 by 1100 (220 working days4 times 5 peak hours
per working day; assuming two peaks) and next by 1500 (the number of units of
capacity corresponding with a standard highway lane), and finally multiplying by
60 (the number of kilometers corresponding with a free-flow travel time of half
an hour). We set the value of time a at 7.5, in line with the ‘‘official’’ Dutch value.
On the demand side, we use an elasticity g of 0.35. To create a reasonable refer-
ence equilibrium, where demand F is such that the travel time is twice the free-flow
travel time tf for the base capacity of K¼ 4500, we finally set d¼ 7.97 1011.
For this parameterization, Table 1 shows the base equilibrium as well as optimal
levels of the most relevant endogenous variables. Most of this table’s content is
self-explanatory. The final column, though, gives the efficiency measure x that
we will use. It is for a certain equilibrium defined as the surplus gain in that equili-
brium compared with the base equilibrium, divided by the surplus gain in the
3With an infinitely lived highway without maintenance and an interest rate of 4%, this
implies construction costs of 45 million per lane-km, or 48 million per lane-mile. This order
of magnitude is well in line with figures presented for the United States in Litman (2006),
who quotes widely diverging estimates that suggest that the median construction cost per
lane mile would be in the range of $5 million to 10 million, while more than a third would
exceed $10 million.
4A rule of thumb in The Netherlands is that there are some 220 regular work days per year
(44 weeks) on which ‘‘normal’’ travel conditions occur. Eight weeks are much quieter
because of holidays, Christmas breaks, and so forth.
Table 1. Numerical model: Base equilibrium and optimum.
K s F D (¼p) c CK x
Equilibrium 4,500 0 7,231 7.5 7.5 31,500 0
Optimum 5,085 5.58 6,380 10.72 5.14 35,593 1
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first-best optimum compared with the base equilibrium. The indicator is therefore
naturally 0 in the base equilibrium and 1 in the optimum.
4.2. Naı¨ve Interpretation I: Mixing Up Capital Cost and Investment Cost
The first fallacy we consider concerns the mixing up of capital cost (‘‘To what
extent do the yearly toll revenues cover yearly interest cost?’’) with investment
cost (‘‘To what extent should we reinvest toll revenues in additional road
capacity?’’). This mistake may seem terribly naı¨ve to the trained economist, but
may in fact not be so far-fetched in the practice of policymaking, where invest-
ments are financed from public funds that are raised through taxation, and no
interest is paid (at least not directly) on capital invested in public infrastructure.
In fact, some current proposals for road pricing in The Netherlands contain the
qualification that toll revenues be used for road investments.
In a neutral-scale-economies environment, where optimal roads are exactly
self-financing, it would be harmless in our model for overall efficiency to impose
the constraint that toll revenues should be used to finance the capital costs.
However, it is certainly not harmless to impose that all revenues should be
reinvested in additional capacity. The easiest way to see where and how the two
principles would diverge is to imagine starting with an optimal road initially, in
an otherwise stationary environment. Optimal policies then entail constancy of toll
and capacity for all future periods, with revenues covering the constant interest on
invested capacity. The naı¨ve policy, in contrast, would use revenues to expand
capacity in the next period, so that capacity will grow over time as long as road
use and toll are positive.
Our first simulation illustrates the consequences. We assume that the regulator
saves up all toll revenues during a year (with no interest revenues) t, and uses these
to expand capacity at the beginning of the next year, tþ 1. We assume that the
short-run toll is optimal at each moment to avoid clouding of results by introdu-
cing further inefficiencies from non-optimal pricing. In our calculations,
we assume that the construction cost per unit of capacity is 25 times as high as
the yearly capital cost, which under our assumptions corresponds with an interest
rate of 4%. We start with an optimal road in year 1 and trace the development of
key variables over the next 50 years.
Figure 1 displays the results. As expected, capacity (upper-left panel) rises over
time as toll revenues continue to be collected. Although the optimal short-run toll
(upper-right panel) falls over time as expanding capacity reduces congestion, the
BPR function will always produce positive optimal tolls for any flow larger than
zero. With capacity set optimal in period 1, it is no surprise that x equals 1 initially,
but falls over time afterwards, as capacity deviates further from the optimal level.
Before too long, in year 19, x falls below zero, indicating that the untolled base
equilibrium produces a higher social surplus than the tolled equilibrium with
excess capacity. The further drop in x illustrates how the negative impact of this
naı¨ve policy upon social surplus becomes worse the longer the policy is main-
tained. Finally, the lower-right panel displays the ‘‘correctly’’ calculated profits, P
(i.e., that use capital cost, not investment cost). With a zero surplus in period 1,
and rising capacity costs and falling toll levels afterwards, these profits fall over
time, indicating deficits. This confirms the claim in Verhoef and Rouwendal
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(2004) that under short-run optimal pricing and under neutral scale economies,
an above-optimal capacity will produce a deficit.5 All in all, there are good reasons,
based on theory and simulation, to discourage regulators from pursuing this
particular type of naı¨ve investment policy.
4.3. Naı¨ve Interpretation II: Imposing Self-Financing Under Non-Neutral
Scale Economies
A second type of naı¨ve interpretation would start from the political and social
advantages that a balanced-budget regime might bring in terms of transparency
and perceived fairness, and would strive for balanced budgeting even when the
capital cost elasticity j is unequal to unity. It is a way to impose a hard budget con-
straint so that costs could be contained. Again this is not an unlikely situation. It
may occur whenever the primary motivation for road tolling is the financing of
infrastructure, as it seems to have been the case for example for the Norwegian toll
rings and for various applications in the United States (e.g., Small and Verhoef,
2007, Ch. 4.3). We investigate this situation by tracing the impacts of varying j
upon the model results of interest when a balanced budget is imposed as a
constraint.
In doing this, we first deal with the question of which zero-profit capacity-toll
combination the regulator chooses for a given j. This combination is namely
not uniquely defined. The upper-left panel of Figure 2 illustrates this for the
5A below-optimal capacity, not actually considered in Figure 1, produces a surplus. Footnote
1 explains why.
Figure 1. Reinvesting all toll revenues: Time paths of capacity (upper left),
short-run optimal toll (upper right), relative efficiency (lower left),
and profit (lower right).
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(base) case of j¼ 1, by showing the zero-profit contour in the K–s space (the
optimum shown in Table 1 is represented by the dot). Note that the isoelastic
demand function with g¼0.35 secures that any capacity can be financed fully
as long as the toll is sufficiently high; hence the shape of the contour. We again
aim to avoid further distortions from clouding the analysis and assume that, for
every j unequal to 1, the regulator sets second-best levels for K and s, so as to
maximize social surplus under the constraint that the budget be balanced.
For an elasticity j< 1, there are economies of scale, and we expect a deficit for
first-best policies; for an elasticity j> 1, we expect diseconomies of scale to
produce a surplus. For j< 1, the second-best (zero-profit) capacity K is therefore
below the first-best capacity (see the upper-right panel in Fig. 2), and
the second-best toll is above the first-best toll (lower-left panel). These patterns
are reversed for j> 1, with first-best and second-best tolls and capacities naturally
coinciding for neutral scale economies, at j¼ 1 in the center of the diagrams.
The Mohring–Harwitz theorem predicts the degree of self-financing /, defined
as the ratio of toll revenues over capacity cost under first-best toll and capacity
setting, to be equal to the elasticity of capital cost with respect to capacity j. The
dashed line in the lower-right panel shows / as a function of j and confirms that
this result is indeed reproduced in our numerical model. A quite different
Figure 2. Ignoring capital cost elasticity: Zero-profit contour for j¼ 1 (upper
left), optimal (solid) and second-best (dashed) capacity (upper right),
optimal (solid) and second-best (dashed) toll (lower left), and relative
efficiency (solid) and degree of self-financing under first-best policies
(dashed) (lower right).
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question is how large the efficiency loss would be from imposing self-financing
when j is unequal to 1. The pattern of x by j, in the same panel, confirms the
intuitive notion that the relative efficiency loss increases with the divergence of
j from 1. But the relative efficiency loss x is found to be much smaller than the
deviation of the degree of self-financing / from 1, reaching values near 0.8 for
the two extreme values of j considered in Figure 2, 0.1 and 2. In other words,
whereas the relative deficit or surplus from first-best optimal pricing and capacity
setting depends relatively strongly on the capital cost elasticity j, the relative social
‘‘loss’’ of maintaining self-financing when j is unequal to 1 is far less sensitive in our
model – provided, of course, self-financing is achieved by setting the second-best
toll and capacity, as assumed in Figure 2. Although exact self-financing under
first-best policies thus breaks down for j 6¼ 1, the social sacrifice to be made for
maintaining exact self-financing, if desired for other reasons, may not be too large.
This is a surprising result, and it is important to assess how sensitive it is to the
key assumptions in our numerical model. Figure 3 shows that the pattern seems
robust with respect to two parameters that warrant particular attention. These
are the demand elasticity g, taking on a relatively low absolute level of 0.1 in the
upper-left panel and a relatively high absolute value of 0.75 in the upper-right
Figure 3. Ignoring capital cost elasticity: Sensitivity analysis of relative efficiency
(solid) and degree of self-financing under first-best policies (dashed)
for low-demand elasticity (upper left), high-demand elasticity (upper
right), low convexity of travel time function (lower left), and high
convexity of travel time function (lower right).
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panel [see, for example, Goodwin (1992), for a review of demand elasticity esti-
mates]; and the power coefficient of the travel time function v, taking on a low
level of 1 in the lower-left panel and a high value of 10 in the lower-right one.6
The dashed diagonals confirm that the self-financing theorem of equation (10)
remains valid independent of the parameterization; the solid lines show that the
relative social cost of imposing exact self-financing, provided it is achieved in a
second-best way, appears to be limited quite generally.
4.4. Naı¨ve Interpretation III: Imposing Self-Financing Under Second-Best
Network Conditions
A final naı¨ve interpretation we wish to highlight concerns the case where the
regulator ignores that the Mohring–Harwitz theorem applies to full networks only
when all its links are priced optimally. Actual applications of road pricing that are
motivated to finance infrastructure invariably concern situations where not all
links of the network are optimally priced, so also this case appears to be relevant
in practice. We illustrate the implications for a simple extension of our single-road
model, namely one where an unpriced parallel road (denoted U) is available, and
a toll and capacity can be set only for a substitute tolled road (T).
This is a modest extension of the classic two-route problem studied by, inter alios,
Le´vy-Lambert (1968), Verhoef et al. (1996), and Liu and McDonald (1998).
Important conclusions from these studies are (1) that the second-best toll is below
the marginal external cost on the tolled road T in order to optimally trade off the
toll’s positive impact upon congestion on the tolled road T against its negative
impact upon congestion on road U [see also equation (15a) below]; and (2) that
the efficiency gains from second-best tolling (as measured by x) will generally be
modest.
Verhoef (2007) derives that in the more general case, where both the toll and
the capacity for road T can be optimized, the second-best toll rule remains the
same as in the classic problem (with a fixed capacity) just discussed, while the opti-
mal investment rule presented in equation (6) for first-best optimization remains
valid for road T also when an unpriced congested alternative is available. Specifi-
cally, the second-best optimum requires
sT ¼ F T  @c
T
@F T
 F U  @c
U
@F U
 
dD
dF
@cU
@F U  dDdF
 !
; ð15aÞ
and
F T  @c
T
@KT
 dC
T
K
dKT
¼ 0; ð15bÞ
where superscripts denote roads, F FUþ FT, and dD=dF denotes the slope of the
(single) inverse demand function.
6For the sensitivity analysis for g, the parameter d was adjusted to obtain the same
base-equilibrium (in terms of flow and travel time); for the sensitivity analysis for v, this
was done by adjusting b.
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Because the second-best toll for this particular problem is below the marginal
external cost, whereas the optimal investment rule for the toll road is not affected
in functional form, the existence of unpriced parallel (congested) capacity causes
the self-financing rule to break down. The degree of self-financing will be below
the elasticity of capital cost, implying that under neutral economies of scale, a
deficit will result for second-best toll and capacity choice (e.g., Verhoef, 2007).
Imposing a balanced-budget constraint under such circumstances would reduce
maximum achievable social surplus to a yet lower level. In our final analyses, we
compare the associated second-best=zero-profit results to the ‘‘conventional’’
second-best results (i.e., without a zero-profit constraint) for varying levels of
unpriced capacity KU and assuming, as we did before, that the government makes
one naı¨ve misinterpretation only: self-financing is believed to be appropriate, but
otherwise KT and sT are set so as to maximize social surplus. The main results
are shown in Figure 4.
The lower-right panel shows that the second-best policy indeed produces a
deficit when unpriced capacity KU is greater than zero. These deficits increase in
KU up to the point where KU equals the second-best capacity that would be chosen
in absence of pricing (KU¼ 5891), a level we shall refer to as K U in what follows.
For KU>KU
, it is uneconomical to supply additional capacity when it is unpriced.
When optimal capacity decreases in toll, as is true in our model but not necessarily
in general,7 it is therefore also uneconomical to supply additional capacity when it
Figure 4. Ignoring network spillovers: Capacity (upper left), toll (upper right),
relative efficiency (lower left), and profit (lower right) for second-best
(solid) and second-best=zero-profit (dashed) policies.
7See also Wheaton (1978), Wilson (1983), and d’Ouville and McDonald (1990).
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is priced. The second-best optimal capacity KT is then zero, as shown also at
KU¼KU ¼ 5891 in the upper-left panel of Figure 4, so that the deficit also drops
to zero. The upper-right panel of Figure 4 shows that the second-best optimal toll
falls when KU rises (naturally starting at the first-best level for KU¼ 0 and
KT¼ 5085, the first-best level of capacity), which reflects that spill-overs upon road
U become increasingly important as its capacity rises. Relative efficiency, finally,
falls from 1 at KU¼ 0 to around 0.5 at K U , which is under our parameterization
the relative efficiency gain that can be achieved from second-best optimal invest-
ment without pricing new capacity. The falling pattern between these two points
reflects that efficiency rises monotonously with the size of priced capacity (and falls
with the size of unpriced capacity). The continuation beyond K U reflects that
efficiency of course falls when KU further exceeds K

U .
To meet the zero-profit constraint, the toll should exceed the second-best
optimal level, causing second-best=zero-profit capacity to be below the second-best
level, as illustrated by the two upper panels. This of course implies a lower level of
use on the second-best=zero-profit road than on the second-best road, which in
turn causes the maximum level of KU for which a balanced budget alternative is
feasible (K ]U in the sequel) to be smaller than K

U , the maximum level for which
it is efficient to supply additional capacity. The deviations of these capacity and toll
levels from the second-best optimal values cause x to be lower, with negative values
certainly not impossible. The right segment of the dashed x- curve in the lower-left
panel considers KU exceeding K
]
U and therefore involves no road T being actually
offered. The welfare effects underlying the pattern of x over this range stem solely
from the variation in the unpriced capacity KU. Not surprisingly, then, this segment
reaches its maximum at K U , where it is in fact equal to x for second-best regulation
because both schemes involve an unpriced road of capacity K U .
Over a significant range of KU, therefore, the additional welfare loss from
imposing self-financing—over the inherent welfare loss from second-best pricing
compared with first-best tolling—appears to be substantial. The reason is that
self-financing requires a relatively high toll, which in turn aggravates the inherent
inefficiency of congestion spill-overs upon the unpriced road.
4.5. Conclusion
The numerical model predicts that naı¨ve interpretation of the Mohring–Harwitz
rule may lead to substantial welfare losses. These were found in particular for the
mixing-up of capital cost with investment cost and for the imposition of a
balanced-budget constraint under second-best network conditions. The losses
from the imposition of a balanced-budget constraint when the elasticity of capital
cost with respect to capacity is unequal to unity were, in contrast, found to be
surprisingly small.
5. CONCLUSIONS
After 45 years, the self-financing theorem of Mohring and Harwitz has become
one of the landmark results in transport economics, and one that has potentially
important implications for real policies—especially now that road pricing appears
to be an increasingly realistic option at many locations. This paper reviewed some
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of the literature showing that the theorem remains valid in more general settings
than how it was originally derived and presented. We also showed that a naı¨ve
interpretation of the result, unfortunately, may lead to considerable social welfare
losses. The economists’ advice would therefore be to apply the theorem, but to do
so with care.
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